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Abstract
I investigate the role of educational attainment on state failure and political stability across the African
continent. For the empirical analysis, I estimate a Linear Probability Model (LPM) for State Failure by
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). I hypothesize that differences in educational attainment in Africa can explain
differences in political stability and state failure. Furthermore, I believe that this effect has persisted over time
and that early educational attainment in the late colonial and early independence era is a significant
determinant of state affairs in more recent times. I find that early secondary educational attainment explains
higher state stability, while tertiary education explains more state instability later on.
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper, I focus on the direct implications of a nation's failure to develop 
well functioning institutions in the education sector. More specifically, this paper 
investigates the role of educational attainment on state failure throughout Africa 
since 1950, the beginning of the independence era. More so, has the effect of 
higher educational attainment persisted overtime? The study uses 31 countries 
ranging from the northernmost tip of Africa to the southernmost. Although 
educational attainment is not directly an institution, a country's academic 
achievement is most likely highly correlated with how well the educational sector 
functions. My investigation is heavily motivated by the work of Robert Rotberg 
(2003) on the failure and collapse of modern states and builds upon the work of 
Alesina, Ozler, Roubini, and Swagel (1996) on political stability and growth. 
 
The issue of state failure and instability is one of great concern for the west and 
the inhabitants of fragile states throughout Africa.  Terrorist groups such as Boko 
Haram (Nigeria), Ansar Dine (Mali), Al-Shabaab (Somalia), and al-Qa’ida 
(Niger, Mali, Algeria) just to name a few have developed in these unstable 
regions. In addition, not much empirical work has been done on the issue of state 
failure, specifically identifying a causal channel for a nations state of affairs. The 
implications of these untested hypothesis is huge, as unstable states are known to 
be problematic. An examination of this magnitude, is a international security 
concern, as terrorist groups are known to emerge from weak or failed states. To 
add, said states are among the poorest and most underdeveloped. Therefore, it is 
important to understand what pushes a state to collapse, in hope that policy can 
work to improve the political and economic stability throughout Africa.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I provide an overview 
of the existing literature. In Section 3,  I present my theory of initial human 
capital on political outcomes. Section 4, presents my empirical strategy and 
econometric issues. Section 5 briefly describes the data and important descriptive 
statistics. Section 6 presents my results, and Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
II. THE LITERATURE 
 
In the field of economics, it seems that the subject of economic development has 
received a great deal of attention since the early twentieth century. Much work 
has been done to uncover the foundations of economic growth in developing and 
advanced countries in an attempt to answer the crucial question: Why are some 
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countries rich and some poor?  Early on, Solow (1956), Cass (1965), and 
Koopmans (1965) theorized that differences in growth rates could be explained by 
differences in factor accumulation, the more traditional neo-classical growth 
models. In particular, Solow argued that cross-country differences in factor 
accumulation can be attributed to differences in a country's savings rate, while 
Cass and Koopmans argued that preferences are the key. However, in 1991, 
Douglas North introduced the role that formal institutions play in development. 
As North put it (1991, p. 97): “Institutions provide the incentive structure of an 
economy; as that structure evolves, it shapes the direction of economic change 
towards growth, stagnation, or decline.” Over the past two decades, theories of 
institutional development have come to dominate the economic development 
debate, in that creating efficient institutions and improving upon old ones drive 
development. In addition, Barro’s work on  the effect of  human capital 
accumulation (1981, 1996, 2001, 2004) on development has made a major impact 
in academia and policy making circles. Barro (2001) found that educational 
attainment at the secondary and tertiary level, had significant positive growth 
effects. In Barro’s work he proxies human capital with educational attainment. 
Although Barro’s recent work on human capital is praised, one must give credit to 
the work of Romer (1990). It is clear that existing empirical literature on the 
relationship between education (human capital) and growth is rich,  and that the 
models derive concrete results and show that the relationship between education 
and growth is positive. However, I believe that empirical literature discussing the 
implications that educational progress can have for a nation, other than economic 
outcomes is lacking.  
 
Rotberg (2003) presents theoretical literature, analyzing the causal channels 
behind the failure and collapse of nation-states over the past 30 years. He notes 
that the academic literature and its implications for international security have 
found its way to the forefront of international affairs as the number of people 
impoverished, starving, and deprived of fundamental needs such as defense, 
healthcare, and education has totaled in the hundreds of millions, killed eight 
million, and displaced another four million; roughly speaking. Also, the 
developments in these weak states are a major concern to the more developed 
states, in a political and economic context. He shows that throughout history, 
weak states have failed or stayed weak for a number of reasons, such as a nation's 
geographical, physical, historical, and political circumstances. However, his 
evidence shows that individual leader’s political and economic actions have 
almost always paved the way to state failure. Rotberg’s theoretical work links 
previous empirical literature on education (human capital) with a framework in 
which we can empirically test the implications of higher initial human capital on 
state stability. Alesina, Ozler, Roubini, and Swagel’s (1996) work helps shed 
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some light on the link between political instability and economic growth, essential 
and quite similar to my analysis. In short, they find that political instability 
reduces growth, and that the occurrence of a government change increases the 
likelihood of subsequent changes, suggesting that political instability tends to be 
persistent over time. However, they neglect the root of this instability, which I 
hope to unveil in my work. Note that Alesina and Perotti (1996) suggest that the 
link goes through the effect of instability on investment, however I believe that it 
goes through education.  
 
Existing literature on education in Africa is abundant and serves my purposes well 
in developing my hypothesis. Huillery (2009) finds that in French West Africa, 
investments in education during the colonial period persisted over time. This idea 
of persistent effects of education, is essential in my analysis. To add, Foster 
(1977) shows that in most developing countries the modern sector is small, 
however there are considerable benefits accrued by the people who have access to 
these positions. Bates (1981) documents the policy behind African nations 
transformation to a more modern industrialized economy, as well as the 
implications for social stratification. These esteemed opportunities are awarded 
economic and status benefits, and importantly an immense premium is placed 
upon the possession of formal educational credentials for access to these 
positions. This type of atmosphere led to an increase in demand for higher 
education in the post colonial period. However, such an increase in supply, in turn 
increases the demand for more higher education. Eventually, supply outruns 
demand and the successful elites end up benefiting at the expense of the less 
successful masses. Thus, african formal education throughout the independence 
era has in turn promoted political instability, as the masses become unsatisfied. 
Hanf, Ammann, Dias, Fremery, and Weiland (1975) conclude that this political 
instability has stemmed from the only political result of education in Africa, 
maintaining elites socioeconomic status in society as they are able to reinforce 
their position by securing privileged access to schools. To add, Bibby and Peil 
(1974) note that access and continuance in education throughout Africa is highly 
dependent on the social and ethnic origin of the individual, in line with Hanf, 
Ammann, Dias, Fremery, and Weiland (1975) and Foster (1977). 
 
 
III. THEORY: THE PERSISTENT EFFECTS OF HUMAN CAPITAL 
ON POLITICAL OUTCOMES 
 
The current literature on the relationship between political stability and growth is 
abundant, as outlined in section 2. However, I look to analyze the social structure 
of education in Africa, in order to explain the rise and fall of failed states and the 
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political stability of these regions throughout the second half of the twentieth 
century. I theorize that educational attainment as a proxy for human capital 
(Barro), is a major determinant of state stability, and that this effect has persisted 
since the beginning of the independence era until today. At first glance, it is easy 
to jump to the conclusion that higher human capital early on, should work to 
increase the political and economic stability of a region, since the growth 
literature points to such an effect of education on economic growth (Barro, 
Romer). However, the structure of the education sector and the social inequality 
prevalent in Africa during the independence era, points to three other possible 
explanations. 
 
• Hypothesis 1: Higher Educational Attainment at both the secondary and 
tertiary level leads to more political stability and lowers the probability of 
state failure. 
 
First, the higher initial human capital a region has early on in the independence 
era, should translate to better state stability down the road. A highly educated 
population is able to infuse new technological advancements and living conditions 
should improve through this channel, which should lead to better political stability 
in the future as the region progresses. Thus, African nations that had well 
functioning educational institutions between 1950 and 1965, set up either from 
colonial times or the new African government, were able to attain higher levels of 
political stability later. In addition, higher educational attainment al all levels 
early on may lead to a decline in social inequality, which would create more 
stability in the region. 
 
• Hypothesis 2: Higher Educational Attainment at both the secondary and 
tertiary level leads to more political instability and increases the 
probability of state failure. 
 
As African nations moved away from an agricultural based economy, towards 
industrialization in the mid twentieth century, having an education became very 
valuable is securing well paying and high status occupations. As Bates (1981) 
notes, African governments implemented policy that removed incentives for 
agricultural production. As African governments took advantage of workers in the 
agricultural sector through the Marketing Boards put in place during colonial 
times, these workers began to demand more formal education in the hopes of 
acquiring jobs in the modern sector, however as the supply of qualified workers 
exceeded demand many were left with no work. In turn, the masses ended up 
worse off with an advanced degree and no place to work. Also, note that 
competition within the elite class led to conflict and over supply, as more and 
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more educated people were entering the job market. This led to increased political 
instability as a new class of higher status elites captured a majority of the power 
and amassed benefits from the state, le
behind. Such developments created an atmosphere conducive to conflict between 
1950 and 1965,  which would continue to escalate into major political instability 
down the road. 
 
• Hypothesis 3: Higher Educational Attain
tertiary level bring about different effects on state stabili
 
At the secondary level, increases in the initial level of human capital leads to 
more political stability, while at the tertiary level, I expect to see more p
instability and an increase in the probability of state failure. In post
Africa, access to tertiary schooling became predominantly reserved for the elite 
class, as access was quite limited for the rest of society. Thus, elites are able to
maintain their socioeconomic status in society by securing privileged access to 
schools for their class, especially their children. In a society where the elite class 
is able to secure higher education for themselves, they essentially neglect the 
masses, who remain impoverished unable to move up the social ladder. In turn, 
such an effect early on, would work to increase political instability. However, at 
the secondary level, increasing levels of educational attainment would work to 
increase stability as social and economic inequality between the elite and masses 
decreases over time.  
 
 
IV. THE EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
• Estimating Framework
 
I estimate a generic Linear Probability Model (LPM) for State Failure by 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). I use a binary dependent 
value of one if a state failed between 1966 and 2014, regressed on a measure of 
educational attainment at the secondary and tertiary level averaged over the 
period 1950 to 1965 and a number of control variables. In addition, I also es
a simple Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression using a Political Instability 
Index as my dependent variable, regressed on the same independent variables and 
controls as stated above. More formally, the equation:
 
aving the masses and lower status elites 
ment at the secondary level and 
ty. 
olitical 
-colonial 
 
 
variable, taking on a 
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where yi is the observed binary outcome of state failure or the Political Instability 
Index in the OLS framework, sei measures secondary educational attainment, tei 
measures tertiary education, and Xi  represents a number of country level control 
variables. The last variable is a standard normally distributed error term.  The 
parameters of interest are delta and gamma.  
 
Xi is the set of control variables described in section 4 and summarized in more 
detail in table 1 of the appendix: Economic Development (population density) 
Ethnicity (Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization), Health (Total Life Expectancy at 
Birth) Colonial Heritage (British Dummy). Outcomes are those outlined in section 
5 and presented in Table 3 and 4. I also control for educational attainment at the 
secondary and tertiary level in 2010, as well as the period between 1966 and 
2014, in order to make sure that the effect of education on state failure persists, 
and that the effect is not due to more recent levels of educational attainment. 
These outcomes are those outlined in section 5 and presented in Table 2 and 4.  
 
• ECONOMETRIC ISSUES 
 
It is important to note that the model presented above in section 4.1 does pose a 
few econometric concerns. First, it remains plausible that control variables 
included in previous specifications do not capture all necessary factors. In 
addition, the small sample size of 31 countries is of course noteworthy, however 
the educational attainment data necessary for my analysis is only available for 
these 31 countries in Africa, which restricts my sample size. Last, 
heteroskedasticity is present in the data. To be clear, my analysis looks to find a 
causal relationship between early educational attainment and more recent political 
stability in Africa. In order to identify such an effect, I control for the economic, 
health, ethnic, and colonial characteristics of 31 countries in Africa between 1950 
and 1965. I argue that these controls are the most precise and that they take into 
account a large part of the additional characteristics that may account for 
differences in political stability across Africa between 1966 and 2014. 
 
First, I follow the existing literature and control for economic development using 
a population density measure in order to take into account economic factors that 
may have influenced political stability in the later period. I use this variable, since 
there are limited measures of early economic development in Africa, In similar 
fashion, I control for the general health of the population using total life 
expectancy at birth to account for the possibility that a healthier population may 
lead to more stability in the long run. In addition, I make sure to take into 
consideration the ethnic variation between regions during the independence era in 
Africa. I follow the existing literature by Easterly and Levine (1997), and take 
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into account that ethnic conflict is an important determinant of the political 
economy of many nations as it leads to political instability and disappointing 
economic performance. I also use a dummy variable to distinguish between 
countries that were under colonial rule by different European powers. I control for 
the effect that different colonial policies and ruling tactics may have had on the 
political stability of those states. Last, it may be the case that more recent 
educational attainment has led to certain state political conditions rather than the 
levels between 1950 and 1965. Thus, I control for such an effect using secondary 
and tertiary educational attainment in 2010 as well as between 1966 and 2010. I 
use these various controls in my estimation strategy and I find that my results are 
robust to these factors. 
 
Second, I must address the heteroskedasticity evident in the data. In the presence 
of heteroskedasticity, my standard errors are sure to be biased and will lead to 
bias in test statistics and confidence intervals. Since OLS assumes that errors are 
both independent and identically distributed I employ robust standard errors to 
correct for this effect. This allows me to correct for heteroskedasticity and 
generate unbiased conclusions from my regression estimates.  
 
Last, my sample size only includes 31 observations. Such a small sample size 
raises concerns about robustness and validity. However, data from such an early 
period in the developing world is not as complete as we would like. Therefore, my 
choices are quite limited to the data available on educational attainment, 
population density, Ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and total life expectancy at 
birth between 1950 and 1965. I believe that I have employed the relevant methods 
in order to generate robust results and identify a persistent causal relationship 
between education and political stability in Africa.  
 
 
V. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Table 6 provides descriptive statistics for the key variables of interest and control 
variables. Note that my sample consists of 31 observations. The small sample size 
is one of the main shortcomings of the data presented in this analysis. Table 6 
outlines number of observations, mean, standard deviation, maximum values, and 
minimum values for each variable used in the study. Most notably, secondary 
school completion rates among my sample ranges from .2 to 11.8 percent, while 
tertiary school completion rates only range from 0 to 2 percent of the 20 to 24 
year old cohort. However, the mean value for secondary school completion rates 
is 1.63, while for tertiary school completion rates the value is .309 percent. The 
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data displays quite a large disparity between secondary and tertiary school 
completion rates in Africa.    
 
• DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
I follow Rotberg’s literature on failed states in constructing my main dependent 
variable, State Failure. The variable is a binary outcome, since either a nation fails 
or it does not. In line with Rotberg, I define “state failure” as the final outbreak of 
civil war, ethnic intrastate conflict, or any major violence between distinct groups 
with the intent to impose a unilateral result. These conflicts may arise from a 
variety of sources, such as a government’s inability to provide political or public 
goods to its people or increased corruption leading to excluded or discriminated 
against groups who loose trust in the government. However, I do not explicitly 
place a restriction on the way in which a state may fail in constructing my 
variable. Although, I do confine such conflicts where more than 1000 deaths 
occurred and leave out violence resulting from independence, since this is 
universal to all African nations. To construct my dataset, I use The State Fragility 
Index and War List constructed by the Center for Systemic Peace. The study 
outlines 332 state conflicts across the globe from 1946 to the present day, 
excluding conflicts resulting in less than 500 deaths. Conflicts include inter-state, 
intra-state, civil, ethnic, communal, and genocidal violence and warfare. For 
clarity, a country received a value of 1 if the “state failed” between 1966 and 
2014, otherwise it received a zero value.  
 
My secondary dependent variable, the Economist’s Political Instability Index 
measures the social, economic and political factors associated with political 
instability in 165 countries worldwide in  2009. The index ranks nation on a scale 
of 0 (no vulnerability) to 10 (highest vulnerability) and has two components- an 
index of underlying political instability vulnerability and an economic distress 
index. The overall index is a simple average of the two component indexes and it 
is comprised of 15 indicators in all. To be clear, the index takes into account 
inequality (Gini Index), state history (date of independence), corruption 
(economist intelligence unit country ratings), ethnic fragmentation (Alesina, 
Alberto 2003), trust in institutions (Africa Barometer World Value Surveys), 
status of minorities (Minorities at Risk Project), history of political unrest (PIFT 
Database), risk of labor unrest (Economist Intelligence Unit, Risk Briefing), level 
of social provision (Infant Mortality Rate), geographic neighbors (Economist 
Intelligence Unit), Regime Type and Factionalism (Economist Intelligence Unit),  
growth in income (Economist Intelligence Unit), unemployment rate (Economist 
Intelligence Unit), and finally GDP per capita in 2007 (World Bank). However, I 
only use the political instability component in my analysis, neglecting the 
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economic indicators.  I use this index to check the validity of the results I find 
with my main dependent variable, State Failure (Any Case). I expect similar 
results since a failed state should have a very high ranking on the Political 
Instability Index.  
 
• INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
  
In constructing my main independent variable, I follow existing literature on 
economic development and measure educational attainment as a proxy for human 
capital, using Barro and Jong-Wha Lee’s (2000) New Data Set of Educational 
Attainment in the World. The data set includes primary, secondary, and tertiary 
school completion rates for 146 countries at 5-year intervals from 1950 to 2010 
for various cohorts ranging from 15 to 74. The data are estimates, using forward 
and backward extrapolation from certain benchmark statistics. In particular, the 
authors used census and survey data from UNESCO, Eurostat, and other sources 
to provide benchmarks for school attainment by gender and age group. In my 
case, I take the average of secondary school completion rates for the 20 to 24 
cohort from 1950 through 1965 and do the same for tertiary schooling. For clarity, 
I take the average of the years 1950, 1955, 1960, and 1965 for the 20 to 24 age 
group. I leave out primary school completion rates as Barro (2010) finds that 
primary educational attainment is insignificantly related to economic 
development, and in my study primary school completion rates are insignificant 
as well. I rather concentrate on higher levels of education in my study.  
 
I control for Economic Development (Population Density, Latitude), Ethnicity 
(Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization), Health (Total Life Expectancy at Birth, Infant 
Mortality Rate per 1000 Births) Colonial Heritage (British Dummy) from 1950 to 
1965. In addition, I control for 2010 educational attainment at the secondary and 
tertiary level as well as for educational attainment in the period 1966-2010 for the 
20 to 24 age cohort. Details are outlined in Table 5 of the appendix. 
 
 
VI. REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
Tables 1-4 present the regression results. Table 1 and 2 present results for the 
simple Linear Probability Model (LPM) estimation by Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS), where the dependent variable is State Failure. Table 1 consists of five 
columns, where the first presents results for the reduced form estimation including 
all 31 countries. Column 2-5 present results including controls for economic 
development, ethnicity, health measures, and colonial heritage. Table 2 presents 
results for the persistent effect of education, controlling for educational attainment 
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at the secondary and tertiary level in 2010 and the period between 1966 and 2014. 
Column 1 presents results for the reduced form estimation including all 31 
countries, while column 2-4 includes the education controls. Table 3 and 4 present 
results for the simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation, where the 
dependent variable is the Political Instability Index. The regression results in table 
3 and 4 are formatted identically to table 1 and 2. Note that below each 
coefficient, I present corresponding standard errors and I note the significance 
level next to each coefficient. In addition, I present the $R^2$ statistic in the last 
row of each column.  
 
 
• LPM RESULTS 
 
Table (1) in the appendix presents results for the Linear Probability Model (LPM) 
estimation by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) of the form presented in equation 
(1), using State Failure as my dependent Variable. First, note that the effect of 
educational attainment at the secondary level increases and stays highly 
significant at the 5 and 10 percent level across specifications. On the other hand, 
the effect of educational attainment at the tertiary level slightly decreases across 
specifications and the significance level falls from significant at the 1 percent 
level to 10 percent once all controls are taken into consideration. 
 
To be specific, the reduced form estimation shows that a one percentage point 
increase in educational attainment at the secondary level between 1950 and 1965, 
decreases the probability of state failure between 1966 and 2010 by 
approximately 7.5 percent. Once controlling for economic progress, ethnic 
variation, health measures, and colonial heritage, I find that a one percentage 
point increase in educational attainment at the secondary level decreases the 
probability of state failure by roughly 8.9 percent. In addition, a one percentage 
point increase in educational attainment at the tertiary level between 1950 and 
1965, increases the probability of state failure between 1966 and 2014 by 
approximately 30 percent. Once again controlling for economic progress, ethnic 
variation, health measures, and colonial heritage, I find that a one percentage 
point increase in educational attainment at the tertiary level increases the 
probability of state failure by 27 percent. 
 
 
However, I then control for education at the secondary and tertiary level in 2010 
and throughout the period 1966 to 2010. I conduct this exercise to check for 
persistent effects of early educational attainment, rather than the effect of more 
recent education. Results for this specification are presented in table (2) in the 
10
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appendix. I find similar results to those presented in table (1). Tertiary educational 
attainment and secondary educational attainment both remain significant across 
all specifications.  
 
At the secondary schooling level, I find that controlling for educational attainment 
at both the secondary and tertiary level in 2010, a one percentage point increase in 
educational attainment between 1950 and 1965, decreases the probability of state 
failure between 1966 and 2014 by approximately 8.8 percent. Controlling for 
average educational attainment between 1966 and 2010, I find that a one 
percentage point increase in secondary educational attainment decreases the 
probability of state failure by 8.1 percent. At the tertiary  schooling level, I find 
that controlling for educational attainment at both the secondary and tertiary level 
in 2010, a one percentage point increase in educational attainment between 1950 
and 1965, increases the probability of state failure between 1966 and 2014 by 
approximately 27 percent. Controlling for average educational attainment 
between 1966 and 2010, I find that a one percentage point increase in tertiary 
educational attainment increases the probability of state failure by 25 percent.  
 
Importantly, I find that educational attainment at the secondary and tertiary level 
in 2010 and throughout the period 1966 to 2010 are insignificant across all 
specifications in table (2). These results indicate that only early educational 
attainment is a significant determinant of state failure between 1966 and 2014. 
Thus, the effect of early educational attainment has persisted over time.  
 
• OLS RESULTS 
 
Table (3) in the appendix presents results for the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimation of the form presented in equation (1), using the Political Instability 
Index as my dependent variable. First, note that secondary educational attainment 
is negative and significant throughout all specifications. Second, tertiary 
educational attainment is positive and highly significant at the 1 percent level 
across specifications. These results are similar and robust to those found in table 
(1) and (2). To reiterate, the Political Instability Index ranks countries on a scale 
of 0 (no vulnerability) to 10 (highest vulnerability).  
 
The reduced form estimation, with no controls in column (1), indicates that a one 
percentage point increase in educational attainment at the secondary level 
between 1950 and 1965, decreases political instability by approximately .28 of an 
index point. For example, such a movement on the 2009 Political Instability Index 
is synonymous to transitioning from the political state of Zimbabwe to that of 
South Africa. The results remain robust throughout as I add on the control 
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variables. Once controlling for economic progress, ethnic variation, health 
measures, and colonial heritage, I find that a one percentage point increase in 
educational attainment at the secondary level decreases political instability by 
approximately .29 of an index point. At the tertiary level, my results indicate that  
a one percentage point increase in educational attainment  between 1950 and 
1965, increases political instability by approximately .85 of an index point.  
Adding on the various control variables once again, my results remain robust and 
the effect slightly increases. I find that a one percentage point increase in 
educational attainment at the tertiary level increases political instability by 
roughly .86 of an index point. Such a movement on the 2009 Political Instability 
Index is synonymous to transitioning from the political state of Ivory Coast to that 
of Sierra Leone.  
 
Once again, I control for education in 2010 and throughout the period 1966 to 
2010. I find similar results to my results in table (2), that secondary educational 
attainment is negative and significant, while tertiary educational attainment is 
positive and significant across specifications. Table (4) in the appendix presents 
my results.  
 
I find that once controlling for educational attainment at both the secondary and 
tertiary level in 2010, a one percentage point increase in educational attainment at 
the secondary level decreases political instability by approximately .29 of an 
index point. Also, once controlling for average educational attainment between 
1966 and 2010, I find that a one percentage point increase in educational 
attainment at the secondary level decreases political instability by approximately 
.36 of an index point. Last, I control for both, and find that the effect only 
diminishes slightly. I find that a one percentage point increase in educational 
attainment at the secondary level decreases political instability by approximately 
.28 of an index point. At the tertiary level, controlling for educational attainment 
at both the secondary and tertiary level in 2010, a one percentage point increase in 
educational attainment increases political instability by approximately .89 of an 
index point. Also, once controlling for average educational attainment between 
1966 and 2010, I find that a one percentage point increase in educational 
attainment at the tertiary level increases political instability by approximately .92 
of an index point. With the addition of both education controls, I find that  a one 
percentage point increase in educational attainment at the tertiary level increases 
political instability by roughly .9 of an index point. 
 
These results indicate that using the Political Instability Index as my dependent 
variable, I once again find a negative relationship between secondary education 
and state stability, as well as a positive relationship between tertiary education 
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and state stability.  Also, I find that educational attainment at the secondary and 
tertiary level between 1950 and 1965 both stay significant once controlling for 
education in 2010, as well as the period 1966 to 2010. This indicates, that in was 
in fact early education that had a significant effect on state stability in Africa 
during the second half of the twentieth century. I once again find the additional 
education controls to be insignificant, pointing to a persistent effect of early 
educational attainment on  state stability today.  
 
 
VII. INTERPRETATIONS  
 
The results presented in table (1)-(4) most clearly resemble hypothesis 3 as stated 
in section (3.3). To summarize, I find that higher levels of initial human capital at 
the secondary level for individuals in the 20 to 24 year old cohort, throughout the 
period 1950 to 1965, increases state stability and decreases the probability of state 
failure. In addition, I find that higher levels of human capital at the tertiary level 
decreases state stability and increases the probability of state failure in the later 
period. To quickly reiterate, I find that a one percentage point increase in 
educational attainment at the secondary level decreases the probability of state 
failure by roughly 8.8 percent and decreases state stability by approximately .28 
of an index point between 1966 and 2014 once I add on all controls. At the 
tertiary level, I find that  a one percentage point increase in educational attainment 
increases the probability of state failure by roughly 27 percent and decreases state 
stability by approximately .88 of an index point between 1966 and 2014 once all 
controls are taken into consideration. The results are all quite robust across all 
specifications in both estimation frameworks and support my hypothesis that 
higher levels of human capital at the secondary and tertiary level bring about 
different effects on state stability.  
 
Importantly, I find that initial tertiary educational attainment levels during the 
independence era in Africa, had a much larger effect on state stability and state 
failure in more recent times than does secondary education. There are a few 
possible interpretations of this finding.  However, I must first extrapolate on my 
findings in general. 
 
First, it is clear that I find a positive effect of early human capital at the secondary 
level on state stability. In post-colonial Africa, the elite class was quite small 
compared to the majority of the African population.  Therefore, increasing initial 
human capital for the masses would allow them to infuse new technological 
advancements and bring about better living conditions. This should lead to better 
political stability in the future as the region progresses economically, and  
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political stability follows. The African nations that had well functioning 
educational institutions between 1950 and 1965, set up either from colonial times 
or the new African government, were able to attain higher levels of political 
stability later on. In general, increased education for the masses early on should 
lead to a decline in social inequality, which would create more stability in the 
region. 
 
Second, I find a negative relationship between early human capital at the tertiary 
level on state stability. In post-colonial Africa, elites were able to secure 
privileged access to schools allowing them to maintain their socioeconomic status 
in society. Such an effect early on would have a ripple effect on increasing 
socioeconomic inequality in African society. As the elites continued to garner 
additional political power, securing privileged access to schools for their class, 
especially their children, they become more powerful and leave the rest of society 
behind. In the end, the elites have amassed political and economic power, while 
the masses remain impoverished, taken advantage of, and unable to move up the 
social ladder. The socioeconomic inequality created by the dynamics of elitist 
education would work to create conflict between the masses and the people in 
power, leading to more political instability.  
 
The class dynamics in Africa during the independence era can explain why 
tertiary education had a larger effect on political stability than secondary 
education. Upon independence in a majority of African countries, the more 
educated black elites were able to gain power. Once in control, this group 
continued to secure privileged access to higher levels of education and maintain 
their positions within the class structure. More so, they made sure that their 
children followed in their footsteps in securing the best education possible, while 
the rest of society may have had access to education of a much lower quality or 
none at all. Over time, such an atmosphere would be conducive to clashes 
between the elite class and the larger lower class. Therefore, once the elite class 
was in power it would have been very easy to suppress the rest and have a large 
effect on state stability in the long run. Central to my thesis, I find that the effect 
of educational attainment in the independence era, has persisted until today.  
 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper presents evidence that higher educational attainment at the secondary 
level as a proxy for human capital between 1950 and 1965, decreases political 
instability and the probability that a state fails between 1966 and 2014.  Also, my 
results suggest that tertiary education in the early independence era increased 
14
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 11 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 11
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol11/iss1/11
political instability in the later period. I discussed three hypothesis or causal 
channels. I found that state stability is significantly determined by levels of 
educational attainment at the secondary and tertiary level between 1950 and 1965. 
A Linear Probability Model (LPM) by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) was used to 
determine the probability of state failure, while a simple Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression was estimated to determine a country's level of political 
instability. The results are robust to a set of controls including economic progress, 
ethnic variation, health measures, colonial heritage, and educational attainment 
estimates in 2010 and between 1966 and 2010.   
 
To end, a discussion of education policy implemented by colonial governments 
and newly self-dependent African governments is necessary. In addition, a call for 
future research and data collection. Although I find robust results, we can not 
ignore the legacy that policy in colonial times left on a country’s political outlook.  
Specifically, the effect of education policy can be hard to empirically measure in 
colonial times, so I share an example. Prior to independence in 1960, the Somali 
state was split between British rule in the north and Italian rule in the south. Each 
region had different education policies and when Somalia become independent, 
and merged to form the United Republic of Somalia, education became a major 
priority with the new government. However, progress was slow as the new 
government was unable to reform and expand the education system effectively. 
They had issues integrating the two different education systems developed by the 
British and Italians. Today, Somalia is one of the most fragile states in the world. 
The country went through civil war in 1988 and total state collapse in 1991. The 
events in Somalia help stress the role that education plays in the developing 
world. To finish, my results may indicate that countries who were able to decrease 
educational inequality, by focusing on the accessibility of education for the 
masses in the independence era, were able to create a more stable economic and 
political environments down the road. In short, education is an important 
determinant of state stability and state failure.  
 
Finally, more data and finding other creative ways to measure state failure, 
education, and inequality in colonial times is necessary to improve our 
understanding of the effect of education on political stability in the developing 
world. Specifically, improving the measurement of human capital using the 
quality of human capital rather than using years of schooling or completion rates. 
It is clear that human capital accumulation is an important component of 
economic growth as demonstrated in the literature, but understanding the root 
cause of this human capital accumulation within Africa's social structure is an 
integral part of such an analysis, which I hope to have shed some light on here.  
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